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Abstract: Community mobilization is a key feature of community-based development projects. Community 
mobilization requires facilitating communication between village members and between leaders and the rest 
of the community.  Is communication an effective device through which mobilization may foster collective 
action? Does informing the community on how to reach a better social outcome key? Should we expect the 
effectiveness of community-based programs to depend on the quality of leadership in the community? In rural 
communities of Mali, we find evidence of high levels of cooperation as measured by a standard public good 
game. Communication between players increases contributions to the public good. Passing of information 
through a random community member also improves cooperation, and leadership skills matter. We also find 
suggestive evidence that changes in behavior are mediated through changes in beliefs. The experiments are 
embedded in a larger randomized controlled trial designed to evaluate the impact of a community-based 
sanitation intervention. As such, our results are relevant for a large population. Finally, we find that the 
program help strengthen the capacity for collective action.  
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strengthens	 the	 civic	 capacity	 of	 communities,	 empowering	 them	 to	 lead	 changes	
necessary	 for	 development.	 General	 disappointment	 with	 top-down	 policy	 led	 the	
World	Bank	to	make	them	into	a	cornerstone	in	the	fight	against	poverty	(Mansuri	

















However,	 evidence	 from	 the	 field	 is	 scarcer,	 especially	 from	 developing	
countries.	 Cardenas	 and	 Carpenter	 (2008)	 point	 out	 to	 two	 shortcomings	 of	 the	
evidence	 collected	 so	 far	 on	 games	 played	 in	 the	 field.	 First,	 the	 relevance	 of	
empirical	 findings	 is	 expected	 to	 increase	 with	 external	 validity.	 They	 recommend	
not	 only	 making	 the	 sample	 more	 representative,	 but	 also	 showing	 how	
	 2
experimental	 findings	 relate	 to	 the	 economic	 decisions	 of	 the	 poor.	 	 Second,	 the	
authors	argue	for	more	policy-oriented	research.		
	
We	 designed	 and	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	 experimental	 games	 over	 121	
communities	 in	 rural	 Mali.	 These	 communities	 were	 selected	 to	 benefit	 from	 a	
sanitation	 program	 designed	 by	 UNICEF	 and	 run	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Mali.	 The	
intervention	relies	heavily	on	community	mobilization.	Experts	argue	that	adoption	
of	good	sanitation	practices	requires	focusing	on	the	whole	community	rather	than	








mild	 framing.	 We	 first	 measure	 cooperation	 when	 no	 communication	 is	allowed.	
We	then	investigate	the	role	of	communication:	does	unmonitored	open	discussion	
between	villagers	playing	the	game	lead	to	higher	cooperation?	Does	letting	a	game	
participant	 advise	 other	 villagers	 on	 the	 actions	 needed	 to	 reach	 the	 socially	
desirable	 outcome	 make	 a	 difference?	 How	 does	 this	 effect	 depend	 on	 the	
leadership	skills	of	the	person	designated	to	convey	the	message	to	the	rest	of	the	
group?	 One	 can	 expect	 that	 unobserved	 factors	 both	 explain	 leader	 quality	 and	






The	contribution	of	 this	paper	 is	 twofold.	First,	our	study	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	




field	 is	 relatively	 scarce.2	Our	 design	 included	 the	 lab	 experiments	 at	 the	 planning	
stage	of	 the	evaluation,	enabling	us	to	 test	 if	 there	 is	any	effect	of	 the	community-
based	 intervention	 on	 cooperation,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 public	 good	 games.	 Our	
study	is	based	on	a	large	representative	sample	of	program	target	communities	for	




Secondly,	 our	 games	 allow	 us	 to	 test	 some	 of	 the	 links	 in	 the	 causal	 chain	
from	 the	 program	 to	 its	 impact.	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 for	 that.	 One	 is	 that	
participants	are	drawn	from	the	pool	of	villagers	in	the	communities	targeted	by	the	
program.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 the	 experiments,	 although	 only	 mildly	 framed	 as	 a	
community	 activity	 with	 no	 mention	 to	 sanitation,	 are	designed	 to	 replicate	 some	
features	 of	 a	 community-based	 intervention.	 Community	 mobilization	 requires	
facilitating	 communication	 between	 village	 members	 and	 between	 community	















for	earned	 property	rights.	 Barr	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 use	 public	 games	 to	 test	whether	 the	 introduction	of	
school	 monitoring	 committee	 in	 Uganda	 improved	 cooperation.	 Fearon	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 use	 similar	
games	 in	 communities	 affected	 by	 armed	 conflict	 in	 Liberia	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 introduction	 of	
community	development	committees	helps	raise	funds	to	a	collective	project.	
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Some	 leader	personal	attributes,	as	measured	 in	 the	household	survey,	also	
matter	 for	 cooperation.	 There	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	 difference	 according	 to	






Finally,	 cooperation,	 as	 measured	 by	 game	 outcomes,	 has	 improved	 as	 a	
result	of	 the	program.	We	find	a	positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 impact	of	 the	
community-based	sanitation	intervention	on	game	contributions.		
	
















The	 programs	 aimed	 at	 eliminating	 open	 defecation	 have	 used	 various	
approaches	 ranging	 from	 high	 subsidies	 for	 sanitation	 hardware	 and	 sanitation	
marketing	to	community-based	approaches	that	aim	at	fostering	behavioral	change	




(CLTS)	 and	 relies	 heavily	 on	 community	 mobilization	 as	 a	 way	 to	 foster	 collective	
action	 and	 achieve	 a	 cleaner	 environment.	 	 Typically,	 facilitators	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
program	gather	the	community	with	the	objective	of	triggering	the	adoption	of	good	
sanitation	 practices.	 During	 this	 initial	 gathering	 of	 the	 community,	 a	 number	 of	




(bucket	 with	 water	 and	 ashes	 or	 soap).	 This	 initial	 gathering	 of	 the	 community	 is	
followed	by	a	period	of	 intensive	monitoring	to	encourage	progress	towards	goals	
agreed	upon	(building,	repairing	and	using	latrines).	Finally,	when	the	initial	plan	is	




CLTS	 is	 an	 intervention	 aiming	 at	 solving	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 a	 collective	
action	problem,	whereas	each	member	of	 the	community	bears	the	private	cost	of	
contributing	 by	 building	 and	 using	 latrines	 and	 the	 benefits	 through	 better	 health	










The	 region	 of	 Koulikoro	 is	 divided	 in	 three	 agro-ecological	 zones,	 which	
reflect	three	distinct	economic	and	social	organizations.	The	Northern	zone	or	Sahel	
zone	is	very	arid,	with	a	long	dry	season	lasting	between	9	and	11	months.	The	main	
activity	 is	 transhumant	 nomadic	 stock	 rearing	 with	 subsistence	 agriculture.	 The	
middle	 zone,	 the	 Sudan	 zone,	 is	 semi-arid	 and	 sub-humid.	 There,	 agricultural	
activities	 are	 more	 intensive.	 Stock	 rearing	 is	 sedentary	 with	 seasonal	 migration,	
and	 is	 more	 integrated	 with	 crop	 production.	 The	 Southern	 zone	 is	 humid	 with	
production	oriented	towards	agriculture.	
	












obtained	 from	 the	 Koulikoro	 Sanitation	 Office	 (Direction Régionale de 
l’Assainissement de Koulikoro).		
	
We	 opted	 for	 a	 systematic	 sampling	 method	 that	 allowed	 us	 to	 add	 a	
minimum	 spacing	 criterion	 between	 villages	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 contamination	 from	
neighboring	 communities. 5 	Indeed,	 physical	 contamination	 of	 fecal	 elements	
through	 air	 and	water	 from	 neighboring	 communities	may	 limit	 the	 benefits	 from	
the	 intervention	 and	 discourage	 the	 adoption	 of	 clean	 practices	 in	 the	 targeted	
villages.	 If	 the	program	is	brought	up	to	scale,	contamination	should	not	be	such	a	






2. We	 draw	 a	 circle	 of	 radius	 10km	 around	 the	 village	 and	 we	 pick	 another	





survey	 module	 (the	 household	 questionnaire)	 gathered	 detailed	 information	 on	
households	 living	 in	 the	 sample	 villages	 with	 at	 least	 one	 child	 below	 age	 10.	 We	











The	sampling	 frame	here	comprises	all	surveyed	households.	 In	each	of	 the	
village,	 every	 other	 household	 is	 randomly	 selected	 to	 send	 an	 adult	 household	
member	to	participate	to	the	games.	Clearly,	selection	within	household	is	not	likely	
to	 be	 random.	7	But	 this	 actually	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 way	 the	 community-driven	
sanitation	 program	 operates:	 they	 invite	 households	 to	 participate	 in	 community	
meetings,	and	it	is	the	household	who	chooses	who	to	send.	
	
An	 advantage	 of	 this	 sampling	 framework	 is	 that,	 once	 we	 apply	 sampling	





Descriptive	 statistics	 from	 the	 survey	 data	 is	 presented	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	
household	data	covers	121	villages,	about	4,500	households,	and	more	than	34,000	
individuals.	 There	 are	 37	 households	 per	 village	 on	 average,	 and	 7	 members	 per	
household.	 Literacy	 rates	 are	 low:	 only	 16%	 of	 the	 population	 over	 8	 years	 old	
knows	how	to	read	and	write.	The	population	is	young,	19	years	old	on	average.	The	
main	ethnic	group	 is	Bambara	(68%).	Most	of	the	 labor	 force	is	 in	agriculture	and	
livestock	rearing.		
	
Looking	 at	 the	 sample	 of	 game	 participants	 (Table	 2A),	 we	 conducted	 363	
sessions	 (3	 per	 village)	 with	 over	 3,000	 players.	 Sessions	 gathers	 23.4	 players	 on	









are	 illiterate,	 and	 85%	 of	 them	 never	 went	 to	school.	Based	 on	 questions	 on	 their	
attitudes	towards	the	community	(belonging,	trust,	altruism,	reciprocity,	solidarity),	
we	constructed	an	index	of	social	capital.	The	average	value	of	this	index	is	2.89	in	









good	 game.	 The	 base	 treatment	 is	 a	 standard	 public	 good	 game	 without	
communication.	 In	 the	 two	 other	 treatments,	 we	 allow	 some	 form	 of	
communication.	 In	 the	 unmonitored	 open	discussion	treatment,	 participants	 are	
allowed	 to	 talk	 to	 each	 other	 freely	 for	 five	 minutes.	 In	 the	 leader	 treatment,	 a	





Ames,	 1979).	 There	 are	 two	 goods,	 a	 private	 one	 and	 a	 public	 one,	 and	 m	
participants.	 The	 experimenter	 provides	 each	 participant	  = {1,… , }	with	 one	
token.	 Choice	 set	 includes	 two	 options	   = {0,1},	 to	 keep	 the	 token	 (   = 0)	 or	 to	
invest	it	in	the	public	good	(   = 1).8	If	the	token	is	kept,	it	yields	a	payoff	p	to	player	
i	only.	 If	 the	 token	 is	 invested	 in	 the	group	project,	 it	yields	a	payoff	of	a	 to	 every	
player	 j	 including	 i.	 In	 sum,	 the	 payoffs	 function	 is	 given	 by:	   =  (1 −   ) +
 (∑   
 
    ).	 Thus,	 the	 public	 good	 produced	 depends	 linearly	 on	 each	 individual’s	
contribution.	All	decisions	are	made	simultaneously	and	privately,	without	knowing	
																																																								





i.e.,	∀  = {1, … , }:   
     = 0	,	resulting	in	a	socially	inefficient	outcome.	In	this	case,	
each	 player	 obtains	   =  ,	 and	 the	 group	outcome	 is	∑   =   .	 However	 if	 every	
player	 contributes	 to	 the	 group	 account,	 i.e.	 ,	∀  = {1, … , }:   
   .   .
= 1,	 then	 the	





and	 those	 of	 others	 in	 the	 group	 account	 yield	 a	 return	 of	  = 1	for	 every	 other	









the	 base	 game	 extensively	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 players	 understood	 it.9	At	 the	 end	 of	
the	 experiment,	 group	 actions	 are	 revealed	 publicly	 for	 each	 treatment,	 so	 that	
players	 know	 how	 many	 points	 they	 earned	 depending	 on	 their	 own	 action.	
Earnings	 are	revealed	 to	 each	 participant	 in	 a	 private	 way	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 three	
sessions	 when	 they	 collect	 their	 rewards.	 After	 participants	 make	 their	 decisions,	
but	 before	 they	 learn	 about	 their	 earnings,	 they	 are	 requested	 to	 privately	 report	








In	 order	 to	 incentivize	 participants,	 players	 earn	 points	 that	 are	 then	
translated	 into	 rewards.	 In	 order	 not	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 sanitation	 intervention	
that	 took	 place	 in	 some	 of	 these	 villages,10	we	 converted	 the	 points	 into	 small	






There	 is	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 possibilities	 for	 presenting	 the	 games	 to	
participants,	 from	 an	 abstract	 game	 with	 no	 reference	 to	 a	 particular	 cooperation	
problem	 to	 a	 heavily	 framed	 situation	 that	 can	 hint	 players	 to	 the	 study’s	 larger	
purpose,	 i.e.,	 studying	 their	 behavior	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 community-




Our	 public	 good	 games	 are	 framed	 as	 foroba	 games,	11	i.e.,	 games	 of	 the	
common	pot.	The	name	given	to	the	token	is	niyoro,	also	a	Bambara	term	for	a	token	
used	 in	 common	 transactions.	 Use	 of	 foroba	 and	 niyoro	 as	 labels	 should	 remind	
them	of	a	familiar	setting	in	which	people	usually	contribute	to	a	common	pot	and	
get	 a	 valuable	 amount	 in	 return.	 We	 decided	 against	 framing	 the	 public	 good	
according	to	the	sanitation	 issue	that	 is	central	 to	 the	research	project	 in	order	 to	




10	UNICEF	 considered	 that	 the	 community-based	 approach	 to	 sanitation	 would	 have	 been	
compromised	 if	 we	 were	 to	 distribute	 monetary	 payments	 to	 some	 individuals	 in	 intervention	








At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 three	 rounds,	 we	 conduct	 “Rankings	 games”,	 with	 the	
objective	 of	 identifying	 leaders	 and	 influential	 individuals	 among	 players.	 	 The	
games	consist	of	a	series	of	rankings,	where	participants	have	to	rank	themselves	in	
a	 circle	 according	 to	 some	 specific	 criteria.	 First,	 the	 participants	 have	 to	 rank	
themselves	 according	 to	 height,	 from	 taller	 to	 shorter.12	The	 last	 three	 rankings	
were	 framed	 after	 extensive	 focus	 groups	 with	 community	 specialists.	 For	 the	
second	 ranking	 game,	 villagers	 have	 to	 rank	 each	 other	 according	 to	 who	 would	
better	 represent	 them	 as	 dancers	 in	 a	 hypothetical	 regional	 competition.13	For	 the	
third	 ranking	 game,	 participants	 have	 to	 rank	 according	 to	 who	 would	 represent	
better	 the	 community	 in	 the	 hypothetical	 situation	 where	 an	 official	 in	 Bamako	
made	a	decision	which	 is	considered	detrimental	 for	 the	community	and	someone	
needs	 to	 convince	 him	 not	 to	 execute	 it.	 In	 the	 fourth	 and	 last	 ranking	 game,	





Our	 first	 hypothesis	 is	 based	 on	 previous	 experimental	 research	 on	
communication	 (Isaac	 and	 Walker	 (1988),	 Cason	 and	 Khan	 (1999),	 Bochet	 and	
Putterman	(2009),	among	others).		
	
Hypothesis	 1	 (open	 discussion):	 Unmonitored	 open	 communication	 between	
villagers	improves	cooperation.		
	
Hypotheses	 2	 and	 3	 pertain	 to	 the	 role	 of	 leadership	 in	 communication.	







regardless	of	 quality	 of	 leadership,	 simply	 having	 one	 community	 member	 inform	
others	 on	 how	 to	 reach	 the	 socially	 desirable	 outcome	 may	 affect	 cooperation.	




Hypothesis	 2	 (leader	 treatment	 I):	 controlled	 communication	 (one	 randomly	
chosen	 person	 is	 instructed	 to	 tell	 all	 other	 players	 that	 the	 group	 as	 a	 whole	 can	
attain	the	highest	payoff	if	everyone	contributes)	improves	cooperation.		
	




proposed	by	Hamerlin	(1998).	 In	this	model,	a	 leader	 is	 informed	about	 the	social	
return	from	cooperation	and	he	passes	this	message	to	uninformed	followers.	In	our	
experiment,	 as	 in	 other	 previous	 experiments,	 a	 leader	 is	 picked	 at	 random.	 	 The	
main	difference	is	that,	in	previous	work,	the	contribution	of	the	leader	is	revealed	
to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group	 before	 they	 make	 their	 decisions,	 while	 in	 our	 field	
experiment,	 it	 is	 not	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003, Potters 
2007, Arbak	 and	 Villeval	 2013).	 Instead,	 participants,	 who	 know	 each	 other,	 use	
what	 they	 know	 about	 the	 person	 designated	 as	 a	 leader,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
informational	content	of	the	message	he	is	instructed	to	convey,	when	making	their	
decision	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 public	 good.	 We	 thus	 test	 whether	 the	 observable	
attributes	of	imposed	leaders	may	influence	group	cooperation.	












In	the	base	treatment,	71%	of	 the	participants	contribute	to	 the	 foroba (Figure	





Contributions	 are	 higher	 in	 the	 discussion	 and	 leader	 treatment,	 respectively	
79%	 and	 81%	 (Figures	 1	 and	 2).	 The	 differences	 between	 treatments	 are	 all	




design	 treatment	 effects	 may	 be	 confounded.15	Because	 we	 randomly	 manipulate	
the	order	of	 the	communication	and	leader	round,	timing	effects	are	averaged	out.	
Hence,	we	interpret	the	8-percentage	point	(p.p.)	increase	in	cooperation	as	a	result	
of	 communication	 between	 village	 participants.	 In	 addition,	 villagers	 who	 had	















The	 difference	 between	 leader	 treatment	 and	 base	 treatment	 is	 an	 effect	 from	
passing	information	on	how	to	reach	the	socially	desirable	outcome.	Since	the	leader	
is	 randomly	 picked,	 average	 contributions	 in	 the	 leader	 treatment	 corresponds	 to	




	Interestingly,	 beliefs	 follow	 the	 same	 patterns	 as	 contributions	 (Figures	 3	 and	
4).	 In	 the	 base	 treatment,	 48%	 of	 participants	 believe	 that	 everyone	 would	
contribute	(average	is	69%).	In	the	communication	(leader)	treatment,	57%	(61%)	
believe	 that	 everyone	 would	 contribute.	 Beliefs	 on	 contributions	 by	 others	 are	
higher	 in	 the	 communication	 and	 leader	 treatment,	 a	 statistically	 significant	
difference	 (Table	 11).	 Again,	 we	 interpret	 these	 changes	 as	 causal	 effects	 of	 the	
treatments	 (open	 discussion	 and	 leader	 treatment)	 on	 beliefs.	 Taken	 together,	 the	
evidence	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 communication	 on	 contributions	 discussed	 earlier	 and	




In	 Table	 3-8,	 we	 present	 estimates	 of	 the	 causal	 effects	of	 leader	 attributes	 on	
players’	contribution	 levels	and	beliefs	 in	 the	 leader	round.	Overall,	we	find	 that	a	
















good	 leader	 (where	 quality	 is	 proxied	 by	 height)	 shapes	 beliefs,	 resulting	 in	




In	 Tables	 5	 and	 6,	 we	 show	 that	 cooperation	 also	 depends	 on	 some	 of	 the	
personal	 characteristics	 of	 the	 leader,	 as	 measured	 in	 the	 household	 survey.	 This	
includes	 age,	 gender,	 literacy,	 social	 capital	 and	 relationship	 to	 the	 head	 of	
household.	We	find	that	most	of	these	attributes	matter	(column	1).19	The	effect	of	
age	 is	 positive,	 statistically	 significant	 and	 large:	 each	 additional	 year	 of	 age	 is	
associated	with	a	0.21	p.p.	increase	in	average	contribution.	Literacy	has	a	negative	
and	statistically	significant	effect:	a	literate	leader	reduces	contributions	by	7.2	p.p..	
This	 surprising	 effect	 may	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 85%	 of	 the	 villagers	 are	
illiterate.	 We	 find	 that,	 compared	 to	 female	 leaders,	 male	 leaders	 significantly	
increase	contributions	by	8.55	p.p..	Cooperation	also	significantly	increases	with	the	
level	 of	 social	 capital	 of	 the	 leader.	 However,	 we	 find	 not	 statistically	 significant	
effect	 pf	 leader’s	age,	 gender,	 literacy,	 social	 capital	 or	 status	 in	 the	 household	 on	
players’	beliefs	(Table	6).		
	
	 Finally,	 we	 show	 how	 the	 leader’s	 contribution	 decision	 and	 belief	 at	 base	











contributions	are	higher	 if	 the	 leader	contributed	 in	 the	 base	round	than	 if	he	did	
not.	 Contributions	 also	 depend	 positively	 on	 leader’s	 beliefs	 in	 base	 round.	 In	





sanitation	 intervention	 on	 cooperation,	 as	 measured	 in	 the	 games	 (Table	 9).	 This	
implies	 that	 we	 cannot	 reject	 hypothesis	 4	 (RCT).	 We	 find	 a	 4.5-5	 p.p.	 gain	 in	
cooperation	 that	 can	 be	 attributable	 to	 the	 intervention.	 In	 comparison,	 the	 gains	
from	 open	 discussion	 and	 leader	 treatments	 are	 respectively	 8	 and	 10	 p.p..	 This	





Extrapolating	 lab	 experiment	 results	 beyond	 a	 specific	 institutional	
environment	 is	 complicated.	 However,	 our	 results	 suggest	 two	 relevant	
implications.	 First,	 leadership	 and	 communication	matter	 for	 addressing	 collective	
actions	 problems.	 Furthermore,	 our	 large	 sample	 is	 representative	 of	 rural	
Koulikoro.	In	this	sense,	the	sample	of	players	for	our	games	is	representative	of	the	
population	 targeted	 by	 the	 community-based	 sanitation	 intervention	 through	
community	mobilization	activities.	Second,	our	mild	frame	allows	us	to	interpret	our	
results	 for	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 community-based	 interventions,	 whenever	 a	 community	
needs	a	high	level	of	mobilization	in	order	to	achieve	the	provision	of	public	goods.		
	
Similarly	 to	 Cason	 and	 Kahn	 (1999),	 our	 results	 support	 the	 idea	 that	
community-based	 development	 programs	 that	 rely	 on	 collective	 action	 should	
stress	 the	 role	 of	 communication,	 either	 among	 community	members	 or	 mediated	
																																																																																																																																																																					
are	found	to	depend	on	their	 leader’s	action,	 it	 is	because	they	know	the	 person	and	may	consider	
her	as	trustworthy.		
	 18
by	 a	 leader	 as	 a	 way	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals.	 In	 the	 realm	 of	 community-based	
sanitation,	this	view	is	already	put	into	action,	as	found	in	the	guidelines	offered	to	
field	 practitioners	 that	 stress	 the	 role	 of	 leadership	 and	 communication	 as	 key	
factors	in	the	success	of	CLTS	programs	(Kar	and	Chambers	2008).		
	
Finally,	 our	 results	 suggest	 that	 games	 in	 the	 field,	 with	 the	 required	









also	 high.	 Communication	 between	 players	 both	 increases	 contributions	 to	 the	
public	good	and	expectations.	This	 finding	 is	consistent	with	 lab	experiments.	The	
proportion	of	contributors	to	the	public	good	increases	8	p.p.,	compared	to	a	base	of	
71%,	 which	 is	 already	 high	 compared	 to	 lab	 experiments,	 but	 in	 line	 with	 other	
findings	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Passing	 of	 information	 through	 a	 random	
community	member	on	how	to	achieve	the	socially	desirable	outcome	also	improves	
cooperation:	 contributions	 increase	 by	 2p.p.	 compared	 to	 the	 open	 unstructured	
















The	 experiments	 are	 embedded	 in	 a	 larger	 randomized	 controlled	 trial	
designed	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	a	community-based	sanitation	intervention.	This	
has	two	 implications.	First,	our	results	are	relevant	 for	a	 large	population.	We	find	
that	the	program	help	strengthen	the	capacity	for	collective	action,	and	these	effects	
are	statistically	 significant.	 Second,	 given	 the	 mild	 frame	 used	 in	 the	 experiments,	
our	 results	 may	 be	 relevant	 for	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 community-based	 interventions,	
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	 	 	Variable	 N	 Mean	 SD	
Average	number	of	households	by	village	 121	 37.455	 13.341	
Average	number	of	member	per	household	 4532	 7.603	 3.891	
Literacy	(age	>=8)	 17412	 0.168	 0.374	
Ethnic	group	Bambara	 20230	 0.686	 0.464	
Average	age	 34406	 18.788	 17.515	


















Table 2A: Participants characteristics 
Variable	 N	 Mean	 SD	
Literacy	(1=read	and	write)	 2860	 0.151	 0.358	
Age	 2967	 35.789	 12.230	
Sex	(1=Male)	 2985	 0.276	 0.447	
Mother	language	(Bambara=1)	 2997	 0.735	 0.441	
Social	Capital	 2983	 2.880	 0.725	
Number	of	players	 2997	 23.340	 2.804	
	
Table 2B: Round contributions and beliefs averages 
Variable	 N	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	
Contributions	at	base	round	 2798	 0.713	 0.453	
Contributions	in	discussion	round	 2799	 0.791	 0.407	
Contributions	in	leader	round	 2798	 0.806	 0.396	
Beliefs	in	base	round	 2778	 0.691	 0.368	
Beliefs	in	discussion	round	 2781	 0.747	 0.354	







Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
Contribution	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 			 		 		 		
Leader	representativeness	 -0.0001	 -0.0006	 -0.0006	
	
[0.0026]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0027]	
Leader	conciliator	 -0.0003	 0.0009	 0.0015	
	
[0.0026]	 [0.0026]	 [0.0027]	
Leader	height	 -0.0034	 -0.0041*	 -0.0039	
	
[0.0027]	 [0.0024]	 [0.0026]	
Leader	dance	 -0.0001	 -0.0006	 -0.0002	
	
[0.0024]	 [0.0024]	 [0.0025]	


























Constant	 0.7525***	 0.2871	 0.3177	
	
[0.1196]	 [0.2128]	 [0.2652]	
	 	 	 	Observations	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	





Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 	 	 			 		 		 		 		 		
Leader	representativeness	 0.0003	 -0.0001	 -0.0003	 -0.0001	 -0.0004	
	
[0.0031]	 [0.0029]	 [0.0028]	 [0.0029]	 [0.0028]	
Leader	conciliator	 0.0002	 0.0011	 -0.0001	 0.0011	 -0.0003	
	
[0.0024]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	
Leader	height	 -0.0052**	 -0.0058**	 -0.0048*	 -0.0089***	 -0.0077**	
	
[0.0026]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0029]	 [0.0030]	
Leader	dance	 -0.0007	 -0.0011	 -0.0014	 -0.0011	 -0.0014	
	









	 	 	 	
[0.0001]	 [0.0001]	
#	of	players	 0.0007	 0.0016	 -0.0011	 0.0021	 -0.0005	
	






























0.1313**	 0.1506**	 0.1269**	 0.1460**	
	 	






Constant	 0.8114***	 0.4178*	 0.4847*	 0.4669*	 0.5381**	
	
[0.1297]	 [0.2494]	 [0.2692]	 [0.2488]	 [0.2683]	
	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,765	 2,765	



































































































Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Contribution	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 	 	 	 			 		 		 		 		 		 		


















































Constant	 0.7438***	 0.4172**	 0.3616	 0.7326***	 0.4061**	 0.3754*	
	
[0.0319]	 [0.1685]	 [0.2220]	 [0.0309]	 [0.1664]	 [0.2181]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	






Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 	 	 	 			 		 		 		 		 		 		



















































Constant	 0.7291***	 0.4443**	 0.4137**	 0.6540***	 0.4520***	 0.4140**	
	
[0.0288]	 [0.1807]	 [0.2012]	 [0.0331]	 [0.1722]	 [0.1857]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	








Dependent	Variables		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Contributions	 Contributions	 Beliefs	 Beliefs	
	 		 		 		 		
Treatment	 0.0323	 0.0478*	 0.0450*	 0.0510*	
	
[0.0276]	 [0.0269]	 [0.0263]	 [0.0258]	
Discussion	round	 0.0777***	 0.0777***	 0.0561***	 0.0560***	
	
[0.0143]	 [0.0143]	 [0.0131]	 [0.0131]	
Leader	round	 0.0930***	 0.0930***	 0.0748***	 0.0748***	
	

































Constant	 0.6968***	 0.8013***	 0.6684***	 0.7835***	
	
[0.0205]	 [0.0568]	 [0.0202]	 [0.0600]	
	 	 	 	 	Observations	 8,392	 8,392	 8,341	 8,341	
R-squared	 0.0108	 0.0224	 0.0117	 0.0193	
Clustered	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	




































































































	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	A.1:Timeline	for	the	CLTS	intervention
April-June	2011 September	2011-June	2012 April-June	2013
Baseline	activities Intervention Follow	up	activities
Surveys in	treated	communities Surveys
Games Games
Figure	A.2:Timeline	for	experimental	sessions
Investment	game
1)	Base	Round,	no	
communication,						
2)	Beliefs	
elicitation	in	base	
round					
3)Discussion	
(leader)	round				
4)Beliefs	elicitation	
in	discussion	
(leader)	round	
5)Leader	
(discussion)	round	
6)Beliefs	elicitation	
in	leader	
(discussion)	round
Experimenters	
explain	the	
game	to	the	
players
Q&A	
session	to	
make	sure	
the	game	is	
understood
Ranking	
Game
Revelation	of	
contributions	
to	foroba	in	
each	round
Rewards	
are	offered	
privately	to	
each	player
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Table	A1:	Composition	of	the	experimenters	team
Recruiter	(Recruter-Installateur):	Individual	in	charge	of	going	
through	households	and	conditioning	the	place	set	for	the	games.
Facilitator	(Animateur):	Individual	explaining	the	games	to	players
Accountant	(Comptable):	Individual	in	charge	of	counting	the	
contributions	and	calculating	the	rewards
Observer	(Observateur):	Individual	taking	notes	on	specific	features	
of	the	games	such	as	players	comments	or	unusual	circumstances
Supervisor	(Superviseur):	Individual	in	charge	of	overlooking	the	
team	of	experimenters
